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ABSTRACT. The recent development and growth of organic livestock farming and the related 
development of national and international regulations has fuelled discussions among scientists 
and philosophers concerning the proper conceptualisation of animal welfare. These discussions 
on livestock welfare in organic farming draw on the conventional discussions and disputes on 
animal welfare, which involve issues such as different definitions of welfare (clinical health, 
absence of suffering, sum of positive and negative experiences, etc.), the possibility for objecti-
ve measures of animal welfare and the acceptable level of welfare. It seems clear that livestock 
welfare is a value-laden concept and that animal welfare science cannot be made independent of 
questions of values and ethics. The question investigated here is whether those values that un-
derpin organic farming, in particular, also affect the interpretation of livestock welfare and, if so, 
how. While some of the issues raised in connection with organic farming are relatively uncon-
troversial, others are not. The introduction of organic farming values seems to introduce new 
criteria for what counts a good animal welfare, as well as a different ethical basis for taking 
moral decisions on welfare. Organic farming embodies distinctive systemic or communitarian 
ethical ideas and the organic values are connected to a systemic conception of nature, of agri-
culture, of the farm and of the animal. The new criteria of welfare are related to concepts such 
as naturalness, harmony, integrity and care. While the organic values overlap with those invol-
ved in the conventional discussion of animal welfare, some of them suggest a need to set new 
priorities and to re-conceptualise animal welfare – for example, with respect to 'naturalness', in 
relation to the possibilities for expression of natural behaviour and in relation to animal integrity 
as a concept for organismic harmony. The organic perspective also seems to suggest a wider 
range of solutions to welfare problems than changes in farm routines or operations on the ani-
mals. The systemic solutions include the choice and reproduction of suitable breeds, changes in 
the farm structure, and changes in the larger production and consumption system - including 
consumer perceptions and preferences. But the organic values may also call for sacrifices of 
individual welfare in a conventional sense in order to advance welfare from the perspective of 
organic farming. Whether this is good or bad cannot be decided without entering into an inquiry 
and discussion of the values and ethics involved.  
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The welfare of livestock is currently the subject of both practical advances and 
theoretical debate. This article aims to discuss the concept of animal welfare in relation 
to the principles of organic farming. It examines the question of whether there are 
livestock welfare issues that are peculiar to organic farming as compared to the rest of 
agriculture. And the related questions: Are there particular values or ethical ideas that 
influence how welfare is interpreted in organic farming? Can the reason for the present 
regulations of organic farming, and the interpretation of animal welfare entailed in 
them, be found in more basic values and principles? And if so, what do these values and 
principles imply for the future development and regulation of organic farming? And 
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finally, what are the implications if welfare is poorer under organic forms of husbandry 
as seen from a more conventional interpretation of animal welfare? 
 
The regulations associated with animal welfare in organic farming are currently being 
evaluated and modified both in Denmark and the EU. This article stems from an 
analysis of the Danish regulations in relation to the latest EU Council Directive on 
organic animal husbandry (FØJO, 2000), and an interdisciplinary study on the health 
and welfare of dairy cattle upon conversion to organic farming (Kristensen and 
Thamsborg, 2000).
1 The discussion of livestock welfare in relation to the principles of 
organic farming is, however, of wider international interest. 
 
 
CONVENTIONAL ISSUES IN LIVESTOCK WELFARE 
The general approach to animal welfare in agriculture and agricultural science is 
changing in connection with changes in the public conceptions of agriculture and animal 
welfare – changes that are manifest in the animal liberation movement and the 
ecological movement. Today there is common agreement that animal welfare is a 
relevant and important issue in agriculture. But there are also different approaches to 
animal welfare and different conceptions of what animal welfare is, which are 
connected to the different traditions of animal welfare science and moral philosophy, 
and to different traditions within moral philosophy (Fraser, 1999; Appleby, 1999). 
 
The approach of conventional agricultural science to livestock welfare is, for example, 
described in the Danish report “Livestock welfare and animal production” (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 1995). The introduction to this report briefly describes the 
development of intensive production systems in animal husbandry, and it is emphasised 
that: "Both in relation to the animal protection legislation and from a general ethical 
standpoint, increased consideration needs to be given to the welfare of livestock".
2 The 
report then provides a description of what is understood by animal welfare and how it is 
handled in research, a description that can be taken as representative of the conventional 
approaches to animal welfare: 
The welfare experience or quality of life of animals can be defined as the sum of the positive 
and negative experiences to which they are exposed during the course of their lives. Welfare 
thus builds upon an animal’s experience of different situations, rendering exact measurement 
of the concept impossible. We must, however, assume that such factors as pain, illness, 
aggressiveness, abnormal behaviour and chronic stress constitute a negative experience for 
the animal. Conversely, it will experience positively the satiation of its need for rest, sleep, 
food, nursing, and grooming. The behaviour, behavioural changes, stress reactions, 
physiological changes and health of an animal can be objectively observed and measured. 
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These factors must therefore be the essential elements in an assessment of welfare – singly or 
preferably in combination. An assessment of the welfare of animals in a given environment 
can thus best be based on objective measures of their reactions. On the other hand it is an 
ethical question to judge what level of welfare is acceptable or unacceptable for farm 
animals. 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1995: 23-24) 
This description is cited at length here, because it touches on many of the key issues of 
the current debate on livestock welfare, issues that are also relevant to welfare in 
organic farming. Three aspects of handling animal welfare can be identified in the 
description, the concept of animal welfare (what is welfare?), the assessment (how is 
welfare measured?), and the ethical question (how well should they fare?). These three 
aspects of identifying welfare problems are treated in more detail later, together with a 
fourth aspect concerning the solution of welfare problems.  
 
As mentioned earlier there are many different conceptions of what welfare is. The 
particular description above focuses on experiences, where others might focus on for 
example clinical health, needs, or natural living.
3 These different conceptions of welfare 
will be outlined in a later section and discussed in detail from an organic perspective. 
But first, in this section, we will look at the relation between the concepts of animal 
welfare and the scientific ideal of objectivity. The point to be emphasised here is that the 
desire for scientific objectivity is entangled with the different conceptions of welfare. 
And this entanglement means that the desire for objectivity may be at the expense of the 
relevance of the resulting concepts of welfare for society in general, and for the organic 
movement in particular. 
 
The approach taken in the description above starts with a conception of welfare. The 
concept of animal welfare is linked to the quality of life of an animal, which is taken to 
be the sum of positive and negative experiences. But since experiences cannot be 
directly measured, it is pragmatically concluded that an assessment of welfare can best 
be based on elements that can be 'objectively observed and measured': the behaviour 
and the physiological and clinical state of the animal.  
  
Donald Broom (1996), for example, starts with the goal of making an objective welfare 
assessment and uses this as a criteria for constructing a scientific definition of welfare:  
The assessment of welfare should be quite separate from any ethical judgement about how 
animals should be treated but once an assessment is completed it should provide information 
which can be used to take decisions about the ethics of the situation. The first criterion for a 
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useful scientific definition of welfare is that it must refer to a characteristic of the individual 
animal rather than to something given to the animal by man. 
(Broom, 1996: 22) 
Such an approach tends to arrive at a conception of welfare that suits the ideals of 
objectivity and, in effect, limits the concept of welfare to something that is amenable to 
independent observation and measurement. Thus causing a bias towards, for example, 
individual animals (or groups of animals) rather than man-animal relations and systemic 
perspectives, suffering rather than positive experiences and needs rather than natural 
behaviour. 
 
But neither of these two approaches to animal welfare science makes clear that the 
choices made on which measures to include in the assessment, are value-laden. 
Constructing an 'objective' assessment by way of selecting objective measures, does not 
make the welfare assessment objective in the sense of being independent of values. The 
individual measures may be made independently of values, but choosing these particular 
measures to represent animal welfare is a value-laden choice – even if this choice is 
based only on the availability of objective measures. 
 
Bernard E. Rollin, amongst others, argues against the understanding of animal welfare 
as something that can be established in an objective, scientific way, independently of 
values and moral concerns in society: 
But what of animal welfare science per se? Is this an area of science where one need not 
invoke or presuppose value judgements? I think not, and will attempt to show that a variety 
of valuational notions, including ethical ones, are involved here as well.  
… what counts as worthy of being treated in animals is not only what science deems it to be, 
but what society considers significant. 
(Rollin, 1996: 7-8)
4 
 
In the following, it will be understood that animal welfare is an 'evaluative concept' 
(Fraser, 1999: 182-3), which is linked with the quality of life of the animals, and which 
is comparable with concepts such as food quality and environmental quality. This means 
that the concept necessarily involves judgements of 'better or worse'. These evaluative 
judgements can be a part of the assessment procedure itself, such as in the evaluation by 
way of the measured opinion of a panel of well-informed evaluators that has been 
suggested by Henrik B. Simonsen (1996). Or they can be a part of the decisions made 
prior to an 'objective' assessment of welfare – decisions which concern the selection of 
variables that are taken as indicators of welfare, how these variables are to be measured 
and how they should be interpreted in welfare terms (Tannenbaum, 1991: 1368; Fraser, 
1999: 183). Establishing a practical, operational concept of welfare that can serve as a 
basis for welfare assessments furthermore involves a 'weighing' or 'summing up' of 
these selected scientific variables or measures, which cannot be decided by empirical 
science alone (Sandøe et al., 1996a). Welfare is, however, not just an evaluative concept 
but also a normative concept like, for example, human welfare and sustainability. The 
value judgements that are involved in the study of welfare and the solution of welfare 
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problems are not independent of the motivating ethical concerns and the discourses of 
moral philosophy (Tannenbaum, 1991; see also Verhoog, 1996). 
 
If one accepts that livestock welfare is a value-laden concept and that animal welfare 
science cannot be made independent of questions of values and ethics, then there is a 
separate task in investigating where and how values enter into the process of science 
(see further in Alrøe and Kristensen, 2000b). Part of this task involves analysing and 
discussing different meanings of the concept of animal welfare and how it is put into 
work in the assessment of animal welfare and in the solution of animal welfare 
problems. With regard to the aim of the present paper, the question is whether those 
values that underpin organic farming, in particular, also affect the interpretation of 
livestock welfare and, if so, how. 
 
 
ORGANIC PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES TO LIVESTOCK WELFARE 
Organic farming incorporates a number of principles and objectives of importance to 
animal welfare. Textbox I presents a generally accepted description of organic farming 
and its objectives, which underpin the Danish Action Plan for the development of 
organic farming. The sources of the description are the Nordic organic organisations, 
but the description is largely in agreement with the aims and standards of the 
international organic organisation IFOAM (1998). Behind the objectives lies the 
fundamental tenet of the organic movement - that humankind is an integral part of 
nature. The pioneers of this movement focused on health and its prerequisites, rather 
than on illness. This led them to the view that health is associated with a continuous 
cycle involving the soil, plants, animals and humans (Woodward et al., 1996). This 
systemic conception of agriculture, which emphasises the interaction between human 
and nature, is fundamental to an examination of animal welfare in organic farming. 
Livestock are an element of this interaction, and often an important one. In accordance 
with this wide interpretation of health, a fundamental principle of organic farming is to 
promote health and to prevent illness rather than depend on our abilities to cure it.  
 
The penultimate objective listed in Textbox I (the objective to "provide good conditions 
for all livestock, consistent with their natural behaviour and needs") directly concerns 
livestock welfare. At the same time, the systemic view that humans and livestock 
together form part of the agricultural system is central to an understanding of the 
implications of the organic principles for animal welfare. It is in this light that the final 
objective in Textbox I, which talks of all living organisms becoming the farmer’s allies, 
should be understood. 
 
Such general objectives may guide the discussion about livestock welfare in organic 
farming, but they do not provide a sufficient foundation for development and regulation. 
And there is no available theoretically underpinned conception of animal welfare that is 
developed from an ecological standpoint. At a recent European workshop it was 
therefore concluded that it is important to build a consistent foundation and 
philosophical definition of animal welfare in organic farming (Thamsborg et al., 2000).  
 
Recently, more research has been dedicated particularly to welfare of livestock in 
organic production systems, and this research has introduced some new concepts into   6
the discussion of animal welfare. In Denmark an interdisciplinary study on the health 
and welfare of dairy cattle upon conversion to organic farming has been performed, 
which included a series of comprehensive interviews with veterinarians, consultants and 
farmers (Kristensen and Thamsborg, 2000). During this interdisciplinary work the 
concepts of harmony, naturalness, freedom of choice, and care emerged as central to the 
understanding of animal welfare in organic farming (Vaarst and Kristensen, 2000; 
Vaarst et al., 2000b). Harmony was understood as an overall concept for the interplay 
between the farm and its environment, between the different elements of the farm, and 
between the animals in the herd. Naturalness concerned the conditions in the production 
system for expressing natural behaviour and for natural reproduction and growth. 
Freedom of choice was an element in the expression of natural behaviour, which 
concerned the individual and dynamic preferences of the animals. Care was understood 
as the counterpart of naturalness, which expressed the special responsibility that humans 
have towards captured and domestic animals (contrary to wild animals). 
 
Textbox I:    What is organic farming? 
Organic farming differentiates itself from conventional farming by the targets it sets itself 
in terms of greater respect for the environment, nature and livestock welfare. For 
example, the Nordic organic associations have agreed on the following definition of 
organic farming: 
"Organic farming is conceived as a self-sufficient and sustainable agro-ecosystem in 
equilibrium. The system is based as far as possible on local, renewable resources. 
Organic farming is based on a holistic vision that encompasses the environmental, 
economic and social aspects of agricultural production, both from a local and a global 
perspective. Thus, organic farming perceives nature as an entity which has value in its 
own right; human beings have a moral responsibility to steer the course of agriculture 
such that the cultivated landscape makes a positive contribution to the countryside." 
This very widely stated definition is fleshed out inter alia in the standards of the Danish 
Association for Organic Farming, the Danish equivalent of the British Soil Association. 
These standards specify the following objectives of organic farming: 
•  To work as far as possible in closed crop rotations and to use local resources;  
•  To preserve the natural fertility of the land;  
•  To avoid all forms of pollution which may arise from agricultural practice;  
•  To encourage a method of cultivation which takes the greatest possible account 
of the environment and the countryside;  
•  To produce foods of optimum nutritional quality;  
•  To reduce to a minimum the use in farming of non-renewable resources, 
including fossil fuels;  
•  To work towards upgrading the quality of urban and food industry waste 
products in order to be suitable for use as fertilisers in agriculture;  
•  To provide good conditions for all livestock, consistent with their natural 
behaviour and needs;  
•  To do everything possible to ensure that all living organisms the farmer works 
with, from micro-organisms to plants and animals, become ‘allies’. 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (1999)  7
Other concepts that have been pointed out as important in connection with organic 
farming are animal integrity, which concerns the balanced harmony of an organism as a 
living whole with interconnected parts (Verhoog, 2000a; Verhoog, 2000b)
5, and animal 
dignity, which starts with the respect for animals as morally considerable beings and 
considers welfare aspects from this wider perspective (Röcklinsberg and Lund, 2000). 
 
Generally, the systemic perspective of organic farming implies that a number of 
concepts, which concern the balance or good function of systems, are used across the 
different levels of living systems. Harmony and integrity are such systemic concepts, 
which are used as concepts for the well-functioning of the individual organism, the 
herd, the farm, and the larger social and ecological systems. Where the term 'integrity' 
has been widely used in connection with animal welfare, 'harmony' is a concept that has 
been used mainly within the organic movement. Harmony is usually employed to refer 
to the larger agricultural and natural systems in organic thought, such as for instance in 
general statements like: "The principal tenet of organic farming is to work in harmony 
with nature". And these general ideas on well-functioning living systems are fleshed out 
and operationalised in the goals and 'standards' of organic farming, for instance in form 
of rules on closed, circulatory processes and precautionary attitudes towards new 
technology. The concept of 'naturalness' is closely related to the general systemic 
concepts. It is based on the idea that natural systems and natural animals are the result 
of a long evolutionary process, which has led to a more or less harmoniously balanced 
whole (Verhoog, 1998). And moral consideration of animals implies taking into account 
their 'characteristic nature', including their natural behaviour. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE KEY CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO 
ANIMAL WELFARE 
As a starting point for the following discussion on animal welfare seen from the 
perspective of organic farming, the essential conceptual differences will be outlined 
here. As noted above, there are different aspects of handling animal welfare questions. 
According to Jensen and Sandøe (1997) it is important to differentiate between the 
following two aspects: 
A: the  assessment of animal welfare that, if valid, can tell us how good an animal’s 
quality of life is in different environments, and 
B: the  ethical decision as to how good that quality of life ought to be – and (we add) 
behind this decision, the ethical ideas that the decision is based on. 
In turn, A and B must be distinguished from: 
C: the  definition and operationalisation of the concept of animal welfare, as 
preconditions for the assessment of animal welfare (A), and 
D: the  solution of animal welfare problems, which implies a wider systemic perspective 
for agricultural practice and research. 
Not only B but also both C and D imply value judgements and ethical considerations. 
As discussed above, the establishment of a concept of animal welfare, which is a 
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precondition of any scientific assessment, implies making a series of choices as to 
which variables are to be assessed and how these are to be interpreted in welfare terms. 
These choices are not made on the basis of scientific factors alone.
6 Nor are the methods 
and lines of development that can be considered as possible solutions to animal welfare 
problems simply derived from available scientific knowledge – there are different ideas 
about good welfare and various ways of reaching a given welfare goal. 
 
The most important differences in relation to the definition of animal welfare (C) are 
briefly explored below, taking Fraser et al. (1997) and Fraser (1999) as a starting point. 
Three basic conceptions of animal welfare are distinguished: 
1:  the animal should feel well, corresponding to the concepts of experience, feeling, 
interest and preference 
2:  the animal should function well, corresponding to the concepts of need and clinical 
health  
3:  the animal should lead a natural life through the development and exercise of its 
natural adaptations, corresponding to the concept of the 'innate nature' of the animal. 
With regard to the first conception, Jensen and Sandøe (1997) further differentiate 
between: 
1a: welfare as the satisfaction of preferences, whereby the most preferred surroundings 
result in improved welfare. This implies that measures of welfare are always 
relative or comparative. 
1b: welfare as pleasure (hedonism), i.e. conceived as pleasant feelings along with the 
absence of unpleasant feelings. This implies that in principle, if we can measure 
feelings in such a way that they can be summed up, then an absolute measure of 
welfare can be provided with which improvements can be measured. 
And in relation to the third conception it is relevant, with regard to organic farming, to 
make the following distinction: 
3a:  the animal’s genetic or innate nature as it has emerged through evolution, 
domestication, breeding and biotechnology – and which continues to change 
3b:  the animal’s naturalness or integrity as an expression of the organismic harmony, 
which can be broken by significant and fast modifications from the natural ancestral 
form by way of operation, medication, breeding, and biotechnology, including 
genetic engineering. 
 
An integrated conceptual model of animal welfare 
Fraser et al. (1997: 199-201) suggest a conceptual model (see Figure 1), which 
integrates the three conceptions of livestock welfare (1-3) that are described above. This 
model provides a common framework for discussing different animal welfare problems 
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selection of measurements, (3) making and analysing the measurements, and (4) taking ethical decisions 
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second component, involves value-laden choices.   9
with respect to the three conceptions, which is useful for the following discussion of 
livestock welfare from an organic perspective because it conceptualises the relation 
between the nature of the animal and its environment. Therefore the model and its 
interpretation is discussed at some length here. The model describes the essential 
aspects of the quality of life of an animal as an expression of the relationship between 
the adaptations incorporated in the animal's nature and the challenges it is faced with in 
the current circumstances. The adaptations of the animal is acquired mainly as a result 
of its evolutionary history and perhaps modified by later domestication and breeding. 
There will usually be a discrepancy between the nature of the farm animals (Circle A) 
and the conditions they meet in livestock production systems (Circle B), and Figure 1 
shows how this discrepancy can lead to three different types of welfare problems, 
represented by Areas 1, 2 and 3. 
 
12 3
Circle A:
“Adaptations” in the innate
nature of the animal
Circle B:
“Challenges” in the
current circumstances
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of three types of welfare problems that can arise when the 
inherent adaptations in the nature of the animal (Circle A) are unsuited to the 
challenges of the conditions to which it is exposed (Circle B). Area 1 represents those 
aspects of the animal’s nature that have no functional role in the prevailing conditions; 
Area 2 represents challenges that surpass the animal’s adaptations; and Area 3 
represents challenges that are more or less corresponds to the adaptations that the 
animal possesses (figure adapted from Fraser et al., 1997: 200). 
 
 
Area 1 represents those aspects of the animal’s adaptations that have no function in 
relation to the given conditions. Here, problems can arise in relation to its needs and 
motivations and the expression of natural behaviour. Jensen and Toates (1993: 162) 
define a need as a condition that, if not satisfied, will cause suffering to the animal. This 
suffering may be manifested in the form of behavioural disturbances, increased risk of 
illness or hormonal changes that indicate stress. The animal’s behavioural and 
physiological needs are thus expressed, even if they cannot be satisfied in the present 
circumstances. An example of a physiological need might be the intake of feed and 
water. Behavioural needs that remain unsatisfied, such as a calf’s need to suckle and a 
farrowing sow’s need to build a nest, can also lead to distress and be expressed in the 
form of abnormal and stereotypical behaviour. Natural behaviour further encompasses 
activity that is not manifested if the environment does not allow it. The lack of   10
opportunity to express natural behaviour can thus constitute welfare problems in the 
form of the absence of the positive experiences linked with that behaviour. 
 
Area 2 represents challenges in the production system for which the animal lacks 
corresponding adaptations, and which it therefore does not attempt to avoid. Such 
disparities can result in problems with its biological function, such as respiratory 
diseases caused by poor air quality in housing systems, stomach ulcers caused by lack 
of fibre in the diet, etc. But disparities of this type are, as already noted, not necessarily 
felt or experienced by the animal before the biological function is impaired, and in such 
cases the welfare problem is not initially manifested in the form of changes in 
behaviour.  
 
Finally, Area 3 represents accord between the nature of the animal and prevailing 
conditions. Here the animal is, to a certain degree, capable of meeting the challenges to 
which it is exposed, by way of adapting and learning. Under these circumstances a 
positive quality of life is possible, in which the animal expresses its natural behaviour. 
Any negative experiences feed into the reactions and learning processes that are part of 
that behaviour. Nevertheless, welfare problems can also arise here, on the border to Area 
2, as the animal approaches the limits of its adaptive ability and is therefore no longer 
able to cope with its negative experiences through behaviour. The immediate 
implication is that the negative experiences can constitute a welfare problem in itself. 
And second that the changes in biological function that result from reaching the limits 
of adaptation can undermine the welfare of the animal. 
 
 
LIVESTOCK WELFARE FROM AN ORGANIC PERSPECTIVE  
The question now arises as to whether there is anything distinct in organic farming’s 
conception of animal welfare, regarding the points raised above. Given a certain 
definition and operationalisation of animal welfare, the actual assessment of welfare (A) 
is no different for animals in organic farms.
7 On the other hand, the ethical decision (B) 
as to 'how good an animal’s quality of life ought to be' can be a distinctive feature of 
organic farming, considering that livestock welfare is one of the explicit objectives of 
organic farming. Improved animal welfare can thus constitute one of the certified 
‘organic qualities’, alongside such factors as the protection of environment and nature, 
                                                 
7 An anonymous referee pointed out that the conceptions and principles of organic farming may suggest 
distinctive assessment methods. In some parts of the organic movement a more qualitative 
phenomenological (goetheanistic) method is used for assessing the 'nature' of the animals concerned. And 
in the study of welfare problems in organic farms the farmers sometimes take part in the research in order 
to utilise their experiential or tacit knowledge about the animals. See also Simonsen's (1996) evaluation 
by measured opinion, mentioned above. This is a very interesting issue, which probably concerns the 
philosophy of science and learning as much as it concerns animal welfare, and which deserves a detailed 
treatment in a separate paper. Alrøe and Kristensen (2000b) investigates science as a learning process and 
the systemic interactions between agricultural science and its subject area, and this might provide some 
background for such a treatment. We do not state that the assessment cannot or should not be value-laden 
and phenomenological – such an approach is probably highly relevant for the farmer's own learning and 
management of animal welfare as an expert on his/her own farm, and maybe as an element in the direct 
contact between consumers and producers in organic farming. What we do state, is that a scientific 
assessment can only be isolated from value judgements by way of a definition and operationalisation of 
animal welfare, which, in turn, involves value judgements.    11
which influence consumer choice of organic products. This is not unique for organic 
products; it is analogous to for example the consumer’s choice of quality-marked 
conventional pork and beef, which guarantees particular concern for animal welfare. 
But the ethical decision is not necessarily a consumer decision. It can also be a societal 
decision to promote certain production systems that are considered to offer improved 
animal welfare.  
 
Such differences concerning ethical decisions on the aimed level of welfare do not, 
however, imply distinct conceptions of animal welfare – they rather presume a common 
conception of welfare and shared ethical ideas. There can, however, also be different 
ethical ideas behind the ethical decisions on animal welfare. And in addition to the basic 
principles and objectives of organic farming, which have been described above, there 
are indications that organic farming embodies a distinct philosophical stance with 
regard to ethical theory.  
 
The deontological and consequentialist traditions in ethics are both 'individualistic' – 
they focus on the moral relevance of individuals (see also Appleby, 1999; Goodpaster, 
1979). The objective of organic farming to make living organisms its allies incorporates 
the idea that livestock and man together are part of a wider ecological or biotic 
community. An idea that has been put forward by Aldo Leopold in his 'land ethic' (see 
e.g. Callicott, 1980). Such a community-based view can form the basis for a less 
individualistic and more systemic ethics, in line with the so-called 'communitarian 
ethics' that is founded on care and ethical responsibility (Fraser, 1999: 178ff; Midgley, 
1983).
8 
 
A systemic view of ethics is particularly relevant for organic farming in relation to 
concepts such as sustainability, in the sense of functional integrity,
9 and the principle of 
precaution. But the systemic view of ethics can also have a bearing on animal welfare, 
and thus form a part of the development of a consistent philosophical foundation for 
welfare in organic farming. The concept of 'harmony', mentioned above, can thus be 
interpreted as a concept of balance and well-functioning that can apply to the individual 
animal as well as to the health and integrity of the wider system, such as the herd, farm, 
                                                 
8 The communitarian ethics can be, and has been, accused of being 'fascist' from an individualistic 
libertarian point of view. But unlike a position that takes 'communitarian ethics' or the 'land ethic' as a 
substitute for the predominant individualistic ethics, the systemic ethic is an explicitly self-reflective 
ethics, which includes both individualistic and systemic consideration as two different paths of extending 
moral considerability (see further in Alrøe and Kristensen, 2000a). The individualistic path of ethical 
extension is the well known historical extension from oneself to fellows, persons, humans and sentient 
beings, and perhaps further to living beings, and all things. The systemic path of extension goes from 
oneself to the family, the local biotic or ecological community, and the global ecological community.  
Such a model of ethics does of course not resolve the conflict between systemic and individualistic moral 
conceptions, but at least it recognises the value in both positions and thus points to dialogue and some 
middle road, or inclusive position. 
9 See Paul Thompson (e.g. 1996, 1997) for a description of two philosophically distinct meanings of 
sustainability, resource sufficiency and functional integrity. Resource sufficiency implies an instrumental 
relation to nature, with a focus on the foreseeable use of resources, food production and food distribution. 
Functional integrity implies a view of agriculture as a complex system of production practices, social 
values and ecological relations. The functional integrity of the system depends on the reproduction of the 
crucial elements, such as soil fertility, crops, livestock, nature and human institutions.    12
and ecosystem.
10 A key question for the development of such a philosophical 
foundation, which builds on both the traditional individualistic approach to ethics and 
on a systemic approach, is the balance between consideration of the individual and 
consideration of the system or the community. This balance is implicit in every ethical 
discussion of animal welfare, but the holistic vision of organic farming forces the 
question to forefront.  
 
We should not expect that the basic theories of ethics, be they deontological, 
consequentialist or systemic, are able to provide answers to the practical ethical 
questions of animal welfare. But the different theories do provide particular perspectives 
for what is taken as problematic and how to address these issues, and in this respect 
ethical differences can be very important. 
 
The definition of animal welfare 
The definition of animal welfare (C) is a difficult issue, on which the principles of 
organic farming might suggest a special interpretation. Organic farming emphasises the 
incorporation and use of natural processes, as expressed in its systemic, cyclical 
conception of production and its description as a sustainable agro-ecosystem (see 
Textbox I). From this viewpoint, and from the objective to “provide good conditions for 
all livestock, consistent with their natural behaviour and needs”, there is a special link to 
the concept of animal welfare as the leading of a natural life (3). Relating this to Figure 
1, animal welfare can be interpreted as achieving the greatest possible accord between 
the innate nature of the animal (3a) and the conditions provided. The fact that the 
natural behaviour of livestock is explicitly mentioned in the objectives of organic 
farming implies that the interpretation of welfare is not limited to the satisfaction of the 
animal’s physiological and behavioural needs (2). It also includes a wider range of 
experiences – and thus, presumably, a wider range of feelings (1) – as a consequence of 
the wider opportunity for expression of natural behaviour. The leading of a natural life 
does not imply the best welfare in terms of the sum of positive and negative experiences 
(Simonsen, 1996), but it does comply with the consideration of positive experiences or 
positive feelings as an important aspect of animal welfare (Verhoog, 2000a) 
 
The emphasis on positive welfare is in opposition to the interpretation that only 
suffering or negative feelings, which are caused by limitations on behaviour, influence 
welfare (e.g. Jensen and Toates, 1993: 177). The conception of welfare as the absence of 
poor welfare is based on a focus on illness, which contrasts with the focus on health 
encouraged by the ecological movement. The focus on suffering and negative feelings is 
also linked to the choices made when the concept of animal welfare is interpreted in 
research terms - that is, the selection and weighting of objective measurements of 
development and changes in behaviour and of physiological and clinical condition. The 
indications of suffering seem more appropriate for scientific measurement than the 
indications of joy.  
 
Given a broad definition (C) of animal welfare – a definition that is not limited to 
animal function (2), but includes feelings (1) or natural life (3), or both – it is possible to 
                                                 
10 On the concept of 'ecosystem health' see e.g. Constanza et al. (1992) and the critical account by 
Lehman (2000).   13
hold the ethical view (B) that livestock welfare should not be limited to ensuring that 
needs are satisfied. Rather, it should ensure that an animal lives a richer life with the 
opportunity to express a greater part of its natural behaviour (e.g. play and social 
behaviour). It is in this context that organic farming’s emphasis on the naturalness of the 
production system becomes clear, for example as it is expressed in the requirement for 
access to open-air and grazing areas. This broader approach to animal welfare is of 
course not limited to organic farming; it is also expressed in parts of mainstream 
agriculture such as the production of free-range pigs. And organic farming also shows a 
range of compromises in relation to the expression of natural behaviour, such as the 
widespread use of artificial insemination and the separation of calves from their mothers 
at a young age (Vaarst et al., 2000a). 
 
A broader understanding of animal welfare can also provide part of the explanation for 
people’s resistance to the industrialised, intensive production of pigs and poultry, 
despite the fact that the production systems conform to welfare standards that are based 
on animal needs and clinical health (see also Simonsen, 1996). Within organic farming’s 
systemic perspective, the consumer’s interpretation of animal welfare is an important 
factor - even where it is inconsistent with the accepted scientific view. Consumers and 
producers are part of a common organic agricultural system that is sustained by the 
consumers' experience or knowledge of the agricultural practice and production 
processes – the organic qualities – besides the conventional inherent qualities of the 
products. An inconsistency between the scientific and the popular understanding of 
animal welfare is also a challenge to science, whether it is to be resolved through 
explanation and promotion of the scientific view or though renewed examination of the 
scientific conception. 
 
A conception of welfare as the leading of a natural life (3) does not necessarily conflict 
with a conception focused on quality of life in form of experiences or interests (1). It 
can thus be in perfect accord with welfare defined as the satisfaction of preferences (1a), 
to the extent that the animal in fact prefers systems that allows it the expression of 
natural behaviour. This approach to animal welfare can thus also support concepts such 
as 'freedom of choice' as a means of addressing the fact that animals have individual and 
changing preferences which we cannot completely know (see e.g. Munksgaard and 
Jensen, 1996). Animal preferences are however not always advantageous to their needs 
and health. For example, if offered a free choice between different feeds, an animal may 
prefer feed that does not meet its needs. The risk of such 'wrong choices' will be greater 
the further the production system is from the natural conditions or the conditions that 
the animal is adapted to (refer to Area 2 in Figure 1, where the animal is exposed to 
challenges in the system that lie outside its innate adaptations). 
 
On the other hand, there may be a contradiction between welfare conceived as a natural 
life (3) and as the sum of positive and negative feelings (1b), insofar as a life rich in the 
expression of natural behaviour does not necessarily result in a greater sum of 
hedonistic welfare. If, for example, the animal’s preference is to express natural 
combative behaviour, this can cause considerable suffering. This question should be 
qualified by consideration of the fact that experiences cannot be measured directly and 
that no method for the summation of pleasure and pain is available (refer to the 
discussion above). However, this does not remove the obvious contradiction that an   14
increase in the animal’s opportunity for expressing natural behaviour (3) can give rise to 
welfare problems related to its physiological needs and clinical health (2). For example, 
the Danish rule that organically raised calves must be put out to grass at three months of 
age has led to recorded problems relating to illness and protection from the elements 
(Vaarst et al., 2000a).
11 Therefore, a broader interpretation of animal welfare that lays 
more weight on natural behaviour can also imply greater importance for the concept of 
'care'. Care is an expression of human responsibility for the welfare of animals that are 
subjugated for man’s purposes (refer also to the animal protection legislation, quoted 
above, and to Fraser, 1999). In production systems where management and control are 
left to a greater degree to the natural processes and animals are allowed the opportunity 
for more natural behaviour, care and management can become problematic with regard 
to animal welfare conceived as the absence of suffering and illness (Vaarst and 
Kristensen, 2000).  
 
The question of an animal’s naturalness or integrity (3b), as a concept for the 
organismic harmony of the animal, might also be a distinct feature in organic farming's 
conception of animal welfare, even though it is not at present stated explicitly in the 
basic principles and standards. But section 5.5 on mutilations in IFOAM's basic 
standards does state that "The animals distinctive characteristics should be respected"; 
section 5.4 on breeds and breeding states that "Breeding goals should not be in 
opposition to the animals' natural behaviour and should be directed toward good 
health"; and – as a more specific rule – genetic engineering is not allowed in organic 
farming. Taking respect for animal integrity as a distinct feature of organic farming can 
also be supported by the general emphasis on health, harmony, and reliance on natural 
processes. Animal integrity can thus be seen as a concept of health that goes beyond the 
clinical view of health as the absence of illness. The concept of integrity is linked to the 
view that one should beware of changing an animal’s characteristic features, particularly 
in rapid or drastic steps, because of the particular difficulty in predicting and measuring 
the consequences for its welfare in a broad sense (as also noted by Sandøe et al., 1996b: 
119-20). This is particularly important in relation to the breeding strategies, and the 
technologies employed to change the innate (genetic) nature of the animals, because of 
the far-reaching consequences. But the concept of integrity can be used broadly in 
relation to interference with an animal’s anatomy (e.g. dehorning or castration), 
physiology (e.g. the use of hormones) and reproduction, as well as to changes to the 
animal’s genetic nature through breeding strategies and genetic engineering. 
 
As a radical example relating to the naturalness and integrity of livestock, Sandøe et al. 
(1999: 321-22) describe an experimental breed of blind hens which displayed both 
improved production results and significantly fewer welfare problems than sighted hens, 
as measured against the normal standards in animal welfare research. Many would 
consider there to be an animal welfare problem in the breeding of blind hens or blind 
pigs, even if this problem cannot be established from the conceptions of animal welfare 
as functioning well (2), preference satisfaction (1a) or pleasure (1b). But in light of 
                                                 
11 As pointed out by a second anonymous referee, this example may not be the best. The problems may be 
due to that the situation for the calf is not natural enough: 'Real' natural behaviour would mean that the 
calf goes with the cow and drinks milk until 8-11 months of age. Compare with the welfare situation for 
beef calves that go with their mother – here the welfare of the calf is not a big problem.    15
other concepts of animal welfare, such as leading a natural life (3), and the animals' 
naturalness or integrity (3b), these kinds of modifications are problematic. 
 
The solution of animal welfare problems 
With the example of the blind hens in mind, a last question arises: does organic farming 
hold a particular perspective with respect to the solving of animal welfare problems 
(D)? Organic farming’s declared holistic ethos means that the solution of welfare 
problems, with their concomitant ethical considerations, must necessarily be discussed 
from a very broad perspective that takes the whole agricultural system into 
consideration. The systemic view of animal welfare is illustrated in Figure 2, which 
shows the interplay between animal welfare at the individual level and the agricultural 
system, with an indication of some essential elements at each level. At the individual 
level, animal welfare is shown as the relationship between the innate nature of the 
animal and the conditions to which it is exposed (in accordance with Figure 1); whilst 
the agricultural system incorporates the nature of the animals, the farm structure, and 
the larger production and consumption system. 
 
Individual level
Animal welfare as the
relation between the
innate nature of the
animals
and the conditions they
are exposed to in the
agricultural system
Agricultural system
the nature of the animals
• breeding, reproduction
the farm structure
• housing systems, management
the larger production and
consumption system
• market mechanisms, consumer
  perceptions and preferences
 
Figure 2: A systemic view of animal welfare showing the interplay between animal 
welfare at the individual level and the agricultural system. 
 
 
Solutions to livestock welfare problems can thus be sought either at the individual level 
or through changes in the agricultural system. If solutions are sought at the individual 
level, without including the wider perspective, welfare improvements must be made 
within the given farming system and with the livestock currently in the system. This 
might for example involve changes to farm routines and care, or operations performed 
on the animals (e.g. dehorning or beak trimming). The systemic perspective offers a 
wider range of approaches to solving welfare problems. The previous discussion 
emphasised how the welfare of the individual animal depends on the relationship 
between its innate nature (3a) and the given conditions. The conditions are largely 
dictated by the farming system. The choice of housing system and production strategy 
thus constitutes an important approach to the prevention and solution of welfare   16
problems (Enevoldsen and Gröhn, 1996), even though, as already noted, the 
management and care of animals also plays a central role for their welfare in a given 
system. 
 
Changes of the innate nature of the animals through the choice of breed and breeding 
strategy is another important factor of animal welfare in a systemic perspective. This 
has become very clear in association with the ongoing development of technological 
breeding methods (including genetic engineering); but even the more traditional 
breeding strategies can produce animals whose nature and constitution has a decisive 
negative impact on their welfare. This is, for example, well documented in relation to 
the breeding of broilers that are, to some degree, incapable of walking normally (Sandøe 
et al., 1999). And in the use of certain (highly productive) breeds for organic egg 
production whose tendencies to feather pecking and cannibalism make them unsuited to 
the free-range production systems of organic farming (Sørensen, 1996). Breeding can, 
of course, also be used to improve livestock welfare by making the animals better 
adapted to the conditions prevalent in the production system, such as for example the 
breeding of polled cattle as an alternative to dehorning. But from the perspective of 
organic farming, breeding for better welfare must include respect for the integrity of the 
animals (3b). 
 
The choices of breed, breeding strategy, and reproduction strategy are important aspects 
for the prevention and solution of livestock welfare problems within the perspective of 
organic farming. The latest EU Council Directive on organic livestock production 
emphasises the prevention of welfare problems through the selection of breeds and 
breeding stock (EU, 1999). Organic farming’s objective to be a self-sufficient and 
sustainable agro-ecosystem (see Textbox I) further highlights the fundamental 
importance of the breeding, reproduction, and growth of livestock that are suited to 
organic production. As mentioned above, there can be a conflict between individualistic 
and systemic ethics (B), and this conflict becomes clear when the systemic 
considerations are included in the solution of welfare problems. The above-mentioned 
EU directive also emphasises the use of rearing and farming methods that promote 
resistibility and strengthens the animal’s natural immune defence. Moreover, it states a 
number of restrictions on the use of medicine, including increased holdback times and 
requirements for renewed conversion in case of repeated treatments. These restrictions 
are not based on an individualistic view of animal health and welfare. On the contrary, 
they can lead to inferior welfare for the individual animal, because of insufficient 
treatment. Such rules can only be understood from a systemic view of the solution of 
welfare problems, comparable to the restrictions on use of pesticides and artificial 
fertilisers in organic plant production. This kind of restrictions on the technical options 
for intervention generally compels the use of strategies for solving problems in 
production by way of more fundamental changes of the production system. 
 
From the systemic point of view, it is also possible to seek solutions to animal welfare 
problems within the production and consumer system in its broadest sense, since the 
farming system, farm management, the breeding of production animals and the 
relationship between consumer and production system interact with the welfare of 
individual animals in many ways. Organic egg production in Denmark, for example, 
faces the problem that today’s consumers have the perception of organic eggs being   17
brown, whereas in fact the breeds with the least tendency to feather pecking and 
cannibalism lay white eggs. Changing this consumer perception can thus be part of the 
solution of an animal welfare problem. On the other hand, the consumer’s ethical 
decision to pay more for products that are certified to be produced with greater concern 
for animal welfare, can be a deciding factor in developments towards improved welfare 
in livestock production. As can the societal decisions on improving animal welfare that 
are manifested in general laws and regulations. 
 
However, the improvement of animal welfare need not rely only on market mechanisms 
and legislation. In the history of organic farming the direct relation between consumer 
and producer and their shared vision of agriculture has been the primary force in the 
development of organic production. Certification and regulations are means to ensure 
that shared vision in today's organic agriculture, where the direct contact between 
consumers and producers has become rarer. And the certification and regulation system 
of organic farming has become more and more complex in the last decades, but detailed 
regulation regarding production and housing systems, etc., cannot in itself secure and 
improve livestock welfare, since care and farm management play a decisive role. So 
perhaps organic farming should highlight its own historically distinctive relation 
between consumers and producers, and use this as a constructive force in the 
development of animal welfare in organic farming. This could, in turn, constitute a 
separate and more direct, experiential form of assessment besides the scientific 
assessments of livestock welfare. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis in the present paper has shown that there are a number of animal welfare 
issues that are distinctive to organic farming. The most obvious one is the ethical 
decision as to how good a quality of life the animals are entitled to, which can be 
different from conventional farming because organic farming has improved livestock 
welfare as an explicit objective. But more important in the present context is the 
underlying philosophical and ethical ideas and the related question of the definition of 
what constitutes good animal welfare. Overall, organic farming incorporates a systemic 
view of human and livestock as part of a larger ecological system. This view is a distinct 
feature that can influence animal welfare by way of emphasising the system’s harmony 
and integrity. The definition of animal welfare in organic farming can be taken to 
incorporate greater opportunity for expression of natural behaviour, including access to 
out-door areas and freedom of choice as a means of addressing an animal’s individual 
preferences. This, on the other hand, can be in conflict with a more conventional 
conception of animal welfare as the absence of suffering. The 'naturalness' and integrity 
of the animals can also be a distinctive livestock welfare issue in organic farming. In 
this context the breeding and reproduction of suitable livestock breeds within organic 
production systems and the choice of breeding strategies and technologies are central 
issues in solving welfare problems. 
 
In conclusion, one can imagine a forward-looking vision for the development of organic 
farming in relation to animal welfare. Rather than involving more detailed regulation, 
this vision would focus on the distinctive features of organic farming: increased 
opportunity for the expression of natural behaviour, animal integrity, and harmony in   18
the structure and function of the farming system, and build on increased communication 
and contact between consumer and producer. However, even within the organic 
movement there are clearly differing values, ethical ideas, and interpretations of animal 
welfare and a fuller clarification of these issues would be a useful tool in the 
development of livestock welfare in organic farming. There is no value-free yardstick 
for saying whether livestock welfare in organic farming is better or worse than in 
conventional agriculture,
12 or for saying whether some aspects of organic farming 
systems lead to better or worse welfare – such questions necessarily entail discussions, 
inquiries, and decisions concerning the values and ethics involved. 
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